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This study extends the literature by examining the relationship between the corporate social responsibility 
(CSR)and tax avoidance. Based on a sample of 614 companies from 15 European-Union countries over 
the period of 2002-2015, we find that, on average, socially responsible firms are more involved in tax-
avoidance activities than the less responsible ones. In addition, we investigate how different CSR activities 
affect corporate tax avoidance. More interestingly, our results show that a strong activity in the economic, 
environmental, social and corporate-governance dimensions is associated with a high level of tax 
avoidance, indicating that CSR and tax avoidance are complementary strategies.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
.Political-economic authorities are concerned about tax payment as it is the main source of state 
finance, and as it is an interface directly affecting the economic survival and life quality of billions of 
people around the world. The availability of tax revenues is crucial for the governments to function, and to 
ensure a redistribution of wealth to alleviate poverty, and provide a variety of public goods covering 
education, health care, security, pensions, public transport, potable water, and other services promoting 
social cohesion and human development. Thus, the payment of tax is considered as part of the corporate 
social responsibility (Mueller and Kolk, 2015). However, some companies document positive CSR 
activities but have, at the same time, a higher likelihood of engaging in tax avoidance(Davis et al., 2016). 
Tax avoidancei has been subject to much attention in recent years. Many scandals have affected large 
companies identifying themselves as leaders on issues of the CSR. There was a great media coverage of 
cases, such as the 2015's Swiss Leaks, concerning the secrets of Swiss banks, and 2014's LuxLeaks 
revealing tax evasion by more than 300 multinationals established in Luxembourg. There was also 
Panama Papers in 2016 disclosing a tax evasion on a global scale through the creation of thousands of 
offshore entities in tax havens. Tax avoidance has a significant impact on public revenues, and thus on the 
economies, and life quality of citizens. For example, according to the European Commission, tax 
avoidance practiced by multinationals is a shortfall of 1.000 billion euros per year for all EU member 
states. Internationally, according to the Tax Justice Network, between 16.400 and 25.000 billion euros 
pass through tax havens. This represents a loss of tax revenue of €189 billion a year for developing 
countries. 
Indeed, the impact of tax avoidance is exposed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), investigative journalists, and other stakeholders who encourage companies to 
inject their tax practices into CSR. A debate is currently underway since the research field of the CSR-tax 
avoidance relationship is unclear. There are mixed results on the importance of tax payments in the 
context of CSR(Dowling, 2014; Hoi et al., 2013; Huseynov and Klamm, 2012; Landry et al.,2013; Lanis 
  
and Richardson, 2012; Davis et al., 2016), and mixed theories explaining the relationship between CSR 
and tax avoidance (Friedman, 1970; Carroll, 1979; Freeman, 1994; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). These 
contradictions are the subject of debate both in the academic and professional circles. Two opposing views 
may explain the effect of CSR on tax-avoidance practices. According to the first view, Sikka (2010) 
considers that tax avoidance is an unacceptable activity in CSR because it has negative consequences on 
the economic and social development. In line with this view, Lanis and Richardson (2012) and Hoi and al. 
(2013) find a negative association between CSR-disclosure levels and tax aggressiveness,. Furthermore, 
engaging in the two activities simultaneously is like an “organized hypocrisy” (Sikka, 2010).Conversely, 
the second view suggests that companies do not consider paying taxes as a part of their social 
responsibility. They argue that reducing their tax burden allows them to contribute with subsequent effects 
to improve social welfare through investment, innovation, job creation and overall economic development 
(Davis et al., 2016). CSR is then, positively associated with tax avoidance. 
This diversity of perspectives and the current worldwide tax avoidance context motivates our 
research. The objective of the study is to examine the relationship between CSR and tax avoidance in the 
European Union (EU) context. The question is whether socially responsible firms are more or less likely 
to engage in tax avoidance. More specifically, we explain how CSR activities are related to tax avoidance. 
These activities are measured by four dimensions, including economic, environmental, social and 
corporate-governance performance. Several studies link CSR dimensions individually to tax avoidance 
(Laguir et al., 2015; Lanis and Richardson, 2012). The examination of the effect of CSR dimensions 
separately may explain more about tax-avoidance practices and tax decisions of a company(Laguir et al., 
2015; Lanis and Richardson, 2012). 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the study sheds light on whether CSR is 
positively or negatively related to tax avoidance by relying on a more comprehensive sample covering 15 
EU countries. To the authors’ knowledge, this paper is one of the very few studies addressing this issue in 
an international context, in particular in the EU context. Second, it contributes to the ongoing debate on 
corporate-tax avoidance on the international scene by empirically testing whether corporate discourses and 
actions are aligned. Third, this study provides useful insights into the types of companies that tax-audit 
efforts could target. This issue is particularly crucial as most countries face tight budgets and pressures in 
order to prompttax authorities to generate national revenues.  
We use a sample of 614 firms listed on the stock exchanges of 15 EU countries from 2002 to 
2015.Based on Tobit regression and GLS regression models, clustered at thefirm level, we find that firms 
engaging in corporate-tax avoidance to reduce their tax burden are more socially responsible. Moreover, 
testing the effect of the individual CSR dimensions on tax avoidance, we find that managerial actions 
designed to optimize the shareholders’ cash flows can generate net benefits for shareholders while 
meeting the needs and wants of stakeholders. In addition, these findings are more pronounced for the 
subgroup of high CSR- index firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents prior literature, and 
develops our research hypotheses. The third section describes the research design. The fourth section 
reports the empirical results, and the fifth section provides the additional tests. The sixth section 
concludes. 
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The Relation Between Tax Avoidance and CSR 
Stephenson and Vracheva (2015) analyze thirty-seven articles from the existing literature on tax 
avoidance and CSR. They highlight the fact that tax avoidance is an integral part of CSR. The debate is to 
know whether the role of the company is to maximize shareholders' value, to ensure responsibility for 
society, or both. We group prior studies according to their results, and present them in the following 
subsections.  
  
Studies Finding a Negative Relationship Between CSR and Tax Avoidance 
At the country level, Lanis and Richardson (2016) analyze a sample of 697 companies over the 
period of 2003-2009, and find that the presence of outsiders on the board of directors increases the 
negative association between CSR and tax aggressiveness. Similarly, results in Lanis and Richardson 
(2011) suggest that the principles of CSR could reduce a company's fiscal aggressiveness through the 
board of directors because external directors are more likely to respond to the needs of society. With 
reference to a sample of 434 US firms over the 2003-2009 period, Lanis and Richardson (2015) suggest 
that tax avoidance decreases with a company's level of CSR. In a study focusing on companies' socially 
irresponsible activities, Hoi et al. (2013) use a sample of 2,620 US firms from 2003 to 2009, and find that 
there is a greater likelihood of engaging in Tax-shelter activities and discretionary book-tax difference. 
They, therefore, suggest that companies engaging in excessively irresponsible activities are more 
aggressive in avoiding taxes. These results reinforce the idea that CSR could be seen as a facet of the 
corporate culture affecting the decision to avoid taxes. Moreover, Zeng (2016) analyzes a sample of 
Canadian companies in the S&P / TSX 60 index over a five-year period (2005-2009) to examine the 
relationship between CSR, fiscal aggressiveness and the market value. The study shows that paying more 
taxes can increase the market value of the company by contributing to a better CSR ranking. Indeed, a 
better reputation for CSR will improve the market value of companies. Zeng (2016) suggests that socially- 
conscious consumers are willing to pay more for products from socially responsible companies. In 
addition, the social reputation is a key attribute of a successful business, and the commitment to tax 
payment can improve it. In fact, Dyreng et al. (2016) note that the public control of tax avoidance can be 
costly for a company if it involves fiscal-audit measures, shareholders' penalties, boycotts by customers, 
or political reactions. 
At the international level, Mueller and Kolk (2015) explore the question to see whether the Indian 
subsidiaries of foreign multinationals pay less tax than the local Indian multinationals. A comparison of 
their tax rates allows conclusions about the use of tax- avoidance techniques by taking advantage of 
multinationality. For example, multinationals may use internal transfer pricing to adjust the income of 
subsidiaries in order to minimize taxes where the tax rate by the host country is the highest. They find that 
local Indian multinationals pay considerably fewer taxes than the Indian subsidiaries of foreign 
multinationals, indicating that these Indian multinationals engage in tax-avoidance activities. They also 
examine whether the payment of taxes differs between subsidiaries of foreign multinationals with a high 
reputation in CSR, and those with a low reputation in CSR; and they find that those paying the highest 
taxes are the subsidiaries of the most socially- responsible foreign multinationals. 
This literature shows that tax-avoidance practices are costly both for the company and for society. 
Tax avoidance is seen as unethical and irresponsible towards the public, society and other stakeholders. 
From this point of view, tax avoidance is negatively associated with CSR since it is incompatible (Amidu 
et al., 2016). 
Studies Finding a Positive Relationship Between CSR and Tax Avoidance 
Landry et al.,(2013) conclude that there is a positive relationship between CSR activities and tax 
avoidance in the Canadian context. They also argue that family firms are less aggressive than non-family 
ones, underlining the fact that the ownership structure moderates this relationship. Indeed, the study 
suggests a misalignment between the disclosures and the actions of a company. Davis and al. (2016) study 
the relationship between CSR and effective tax rates for US firms, and provide new findings that socially 
responsible firms avoid more taxes, suggesting that CSR and taxes act as substitutes rather than 
complements. The results of the study suggest that, at least for US public corporations, tax payments are 
not considered as a significant socially-responsible activity by an influential subset of stakeholders. They 
interpret their findings as evidence that socially responsible corporations place shareholder interests ahead 
of those of other stakeholders, and suggest that companies can use CSR as a counterweight to aggressive 
tax avoidance so as to maintain an image of accountability, and avoid reputational costs associated with 
tax avoidance. Moreover, Preuss (2010) compares the codes of conduct of Offshore Finance Centres 
(OFCs) and US firms. He finds that companies located in tax havens do not have lower codes of conduct, 
  
indicating that these companies are not less socially responsible than US firms. Consistent with these 
findings, Col and Patel (2016) assert that companies are strengthening their CSR practices within two 
years of the first establishment of subsidiary in tax havens abroad. In addition, Huseynov and Klamm 
(2012) provide evidence that in some cases, it may be socially acceptable to reduce tax payments. As 
declining tax payments increase profitability, companies are better placed to take part in costly CSR 
activities (Huseynov and Klamm, 2012).  
A potential explanation for these mixed results could be certain limitations in the studies whether it is 
at the level of the variation of the measures of CSR or the measures of tax avoidance, which is difficult to 
grasp, or the difference between the contexts studied and the generalization from the samples examined. 
These studies focus on firm-level data from countries such as Australia (Lanis and Richardson, 2012), 
Canada (Landry et al., 2013 and Zeng, 2016), the United States (e.g., Hoi et al.,2013; Lanis and 
Richardson, 2015), France (Laguir et al., 2015) and India (Muller and Kolk, 2012). A few studies focused 
on an international sample and members of the EU have been largely unexplored. However, Jones et al., 
(2017) use a large sample covering more than 30 countries. They find a significant negative relationship 
between CSR levels and tax aggressiveness on the Asian sub‑sample, but no relation on the North 
American, European and UK sub‑samples. 
Both activities have significant costs and benefits for the company, the shareholders and the society 
as a whole. Some CSR theories developed in the literature suggest that companies have social obligations 
that go beyond maximizing shareholders' wealth (Carroll, 1979; Freeman, 1994; Garriga and Mele, 2004). 
According to this theory, companies that do value the CSR will dedicate resources to socially responsible 
activities that do not maximize inevitably the economic performance. However, based on Friedmann's 
theory (1970), "there is one and only one social responsibility of business to use its resources and engage 
in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, 
engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.". According to this logic, spending 
resources for CSR activities would be to assume the role of the political power supposed to collect taxes 
and redistribute wealth for the welfare of the society. Achieving social welfare is the role of governments, 
not the role of businesses. This approach advocates that the sole responsibility of a company is to increase 
the benefit of its shareholders, implying that managers must engage in tax-avoidance practices as long as it 
is profitable, and any activity reducing shareholders' wealth is symptomatic of an agency problem 
(Friedman, 1970; Moser and Martin, 2012). Thus, all CSR activities are considered as constraints a firm 
has to integrate into its financial-objective function, and these activities should ultimately enrich 
shareholders(Friedman, 1970). Therefore, from a pure economic point of view, tax avoidance and CSR are 
complementary, and any expense for CSR would be offset by a decrease in the tax paid. As a result, and in 
line with the assumptions of shareholder theory, we expect a positive relationship between CSR and tax 
avoidance. 
H1: CSR is positively associated with tax avoidance. 
CSR Activities and Tax Avoidance 
. According to Laguir et al.,(2015), Lanis and Richardson (2012), and Johnson and Greening (1999), 
aggregating CSR dimensions into one index is inappropriate, and some of interpretable information can be 
lost. Thus, we extend the studies of Lanis and Richardson (2012), and Laguir et al., (2015) to determine 
which activities of CSR are associated with the probability that a company avoids its tax liabilities 
Martin et al., (2009) advocates thatin an economy advancing shareholders’ interests, and 
concentrating on achieving a higher-value creation for them, the result could be failures in the financial 
markets like many of companies involved (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and others)as the consumer 
confidence constitutes the economic performance index of CSR (see Appendix 1). The study of Hardeck 
and Hertl (2014) discusses the role of consumers in determining the relationship between tax avoidance 
and CSR in the German context. They find that consumers have harmful effects on companies adopting 
tax-aggressive strategies through the limited purchase intention and reputation damage. More specifically, 
"consumers are not willing to pay a price premium for products sold by responsible tax-planning 
companies, but rather punish aggressive tax-planning companies through a slightly lower willingness to 
  
pay" (Hardeck and Hertl, 2014, p. 309). Thus, consumers have a negative attitude towards tax avoidance, 
and react more strongly to media coverage about the tax strategies of companies.  
In line with the finding of Laguir et al., (2015) asserting that the economic dimension of CSR affects 
positively the level of tax avoidance, Brealey et al., (2007), and Brigham and Houston (2000) state that the 
primary goal of the firm is to maximize the shareholders' wealth through increasing the current value of 
the company’s shares. Besides, Huseynov and Klamm (2012) argue that in some cases, it may be socially 
acceptable to reduce tax payments since reducing tax burden may increase the company's value (Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2009; Wilson, 2009),decrease the cost of capital (Goh et al, 2016), and increase shareholders' 
wealth (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010).Overall, it is reasonable to expect a significant relation between the 
CSR-economic score and tax avoidance. Hence, the first research sub hypothesis is: 
H1a: The level of the CSR-economic performance is positively associated with tax avoidance. 
As regards to the relationship between the CSR-governance dimension and tax avoidance, there is 
again no consensus among researchers. The primary role of the board of directors is to represent 
shareholders, and manage the companies' decisions to their best interests. In this sense, Wilson (2009) 
argues that firms engaging in tax-shelter activities with a good corporate governance show a higher 
positive abnormal return than firms with poor corporate governance. In line with this hypothesis, 
Huseynov and Klamm (2012) find that the better the corporate governance is, the higher the likelihood of 
tax avoidance is. Furthermore, Armstrong et al., (2015) report that firms with more financially 
sophisticated and independent boards encourage managers to engage in more tax avoidance. Besides, 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that the level of tax avoidance decreases when the managerial 
diversion increases. 
From the point of view that governance is primarily a means by which for-profit companies deal with 
economic concerns related to shareholders, customers and suppliers, we could expect a positive 
relationship with tax avoidance. At the same time, corporate governance is secondarily a means by which 
companies manage the environmental and social impacts of their business, and builds credibility with 
external stakeholders. The social and environmental function is, however, a recent concern discussed in 
the boards of directors, and ultimately integrated to protect shareholders. As pointed out by Hoi et al. 
(2013), the CSR could increase shareholders' value because it allows them to be protected against the 
negative effects of tax aggressiveness. Thus, we empirically test the following research sub-hypothesis: 
H1b: The level of the CSR-governance performance is positively associated with tax avoidance 
The CSR-social performance component is intriguing because it suggests that companies are 
motivated to make decisions that are not always aimed at maximizing shareholders' wealth. Supporters of 
stakeholder theory argue that companies must also reach the stakeholders’ goals(Carroll, 1991; Freeman, 
1994).Freeman (2010) states that companies have relationships with many constituencies, and that these 
stakeholders are affected by or may affect the achievement of an organization's objectives and actions. It 
is unfavorable to concentrate only on the interests of the shareholders. A socially responsible firm should 
consider all stakeholder groups in its decision-making processes (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Carroll, 
1991; Freeman, 1994; and Payne and Raiborn, 2018). Findings of Laguir and al. (2015) document a 
decrease in firms’ tax avoidance when the social dimension of CSR increases. Lanis and Richardson 
(2012) find the same results showing that the level of disclosure relative to social investment and CSR 
strategy negatively affect tax aggressiveness. Thus, corporate management should take into account not 
only the owners but also non-owners stakeholders(Lanis and Richardson,2012). However, based on 
Friedman’s theory, managers can integrate the social-stakeholder dimension into their decision-making 
process as long as it does not harm the achievement of economic objectives. So, as long as social 
investments allow for some legitimacy and enhance revenue growth, it can be expected that social 
investments do not contradict a strategy of minimizing tax payments. For example, affording health, safety 
and development opportunities to employees could be a key factor in achieving wealth, and at the same 
time being a good citizen in the community. Consistent with this development, we posit the following sub-
hypothesis: 
H1c: The level of the CSR-social performance is associated with tax avoidance. 
  
Finally, the environmental dimension focuses on how corporations might reduce their resource 
diversion and toxic emissions, and promote product innovation. Companies manage the environmental 
impacts of their business to build up credibility by internal and external stakeholders. These 
environmental-protection activities are costly to the firm, and need a conscious effort to be accomplished. 
From an economic point of view, the need for additional resources could encourage tax avoidance for 
companies involved in environmental issues. Nevertheless, from a legitimacy and corporate culture point 
of view, most environment-conscious companies would not evade taxes. Results of the literature find no 
significant relationship between the CSR environmental performance and tax avoidance (Lanis and 
Richardson, 2012; Laguir et al., 2015). Consistent with the idea that environmental dimension affects the 
companies' costs, the stakeholders' wage and well-being; we posit the following sub-hypothesis: 
H1d: The level of the CSR-environmental performance is associated with tax avoidance. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data and Sample Selection 
The final panel data comprises 614 European companies and 8596 observations from 15 EU 
countries over the period of2002-2015. We construct our sample by combining different databases. We 
collected data from Thomson Reuters DataStream database, and we obtained the index of CSR from 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4. 
The sample selection is motivated by three reasons. First, in this study, we use a large international 
sample to provide more generalizable evidence compared to prior studies focusing on a single country 
(Lanis and Richardson, 2012; Laguir et al., 2015). At the same time, focusing only on the EU allows us to 
have consistency in our sample, and ensures a certain degree of comparability regarding tax rules and the 
regulation of CSR. This does not eliminate the fact that there are differences between countries in tax and 
CSR legislation, which could potentially disturb the results of the study. Second, we exclude the rest of 
the EU Member States since they are all emerging countries, and their CSR data are unavailable in 
ASSET4.Third, following the economic crisis and its tangible social consequences, the EU was the first to 
convert to the CSR movement (Mullerat, 2013).The EU is, therefore, a favorable ground for exploring the 
relationship between CSR and tax avoidance. 
The initial sample, comprised of all publicly-traded firms in the 15 EU countries as in Datastream 
Database, is further reduced by the following exclusions:(1) All companies that do not have data for the 
14 years of the study and (2) financial companies because government regulations are likely to affect their 
tax-avoidance measures differently. Panel A of table 1 presents the sample-selection procedure. Panel B of 
the same table presents the distribution of the sample by industry. The main industries represented are the 
manufacturing (45.11 percent), utilities (18.73 percent) and services (13.19 percent). Panel C indicates the 
distribution of the sample across countries. The majority of companies are established in the United 
Kingdom (34.69 percent), France (13.36 percent) and Germany (9.77 percent). It is to note that companies 
in these countries maybe more likely to disclose their CSR activities than others because of stronger 
disclosure regulations. 
 
 
TABLE 1 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND CHARACTERISTICS 
Panel A: Summary of sample-selection criteria 
Publicly- traded firms in DataStream                                                                                                   3222 
Less: Firms with missing data                                                                                                    2361 
Less: Financial institutions      247 
Final sample      614 
 
  
Panel B: Industry distribution of sample firms 
Industry SIC codes Number of Firms Percentage of Firms 
Mining 10-14 36 5.86 
Construction 15-17 36 5.86 
Manufacturing 20-39 277 45.11 
Utilities 40-49 115 18.73 
Wholesale trade 50-51 22 3.58 
Retail trade 52-59 47 7.65 
Services 70-89 81 13.19 
Total 
 614 100.00 
 
Panel C: Sample distribution by country 
Country Number of Firms Percentage of Firms 
Austria 11 1.79 
Belgium 21 3.42 
Denmark 23 3.75 
Finland 29 4.72 
France 82 13.36 
Germany 60 9.77 
Greece 11 1.79 
Ireland 9 1.47 
Italy 27 4.40 
Netherlands 29 4.72 
Poland 10 1.63 
Portugal 8 1.30 
Spain 34 5.54 
Sweden 47 7.65 
UK 213 34.69 
Total 614 100.00 
Dependent variable 
We use multiple proxies to measure our dependent variable so as to capture a broad range of 
corporate tax-avoidance activities. According to Hanlon andHeitzman (2010),no measure is likely to 
capture all tax-avoidance behaviors, and each measure has its own limitations. Thus, the recent literature 
has developed several corporate tax-avoidance measures (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Frank et al., 2009; 
Dyreng et al., 2010). To improve the robustness of our empirical results, we use two different proxies. 
The dependent variable of this analysis is the extent of corporate tax avoidance. The two widely used 
proxies to capture tax-avoidance behaviors according to the previous literature, calculated from financial 
statement data, are the effective tax rate (ETR) and the book-tax difference (BTD) (e, g., Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2010;Gaaya et al., 2017).It has always been problematic to measure tax avoidance since it is 
not directly observable due to the private nature of tax returns and the insufficient information about 
taxable income (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010).Despite the fact that financial statements allow estimating 
taxable income, it remains an approximation, and the real taxable income could be different. 
Our primary dependent variable is ETR which we define as the total income taxes divided by pre-tax 
accounting income. The ETR is widely used as a measure of corporate tax burden across corporations 
(Dyreng et al., 2008). The ETR measures the adeptness of a corporation in reducing its current tax liability 
  
relative to its pre-tax accounting income. The ETR is an inverse function of tax avoidance. Overall, a 
lower ETR implies a higher level of tax avoidance. Thus, we use the ETR as a reversed measure of the 
dependent variable tax avoidance (Frank et al., 2009). In addition, the ETRii must be positive (Gaaya et 
al., 2017). We find that eliminating observations with negative and less than zero pre-tax income improves 
the power of some tests. All the results remain robust if we exclude observations with negative pre-tax 
income. 
Our second proxy measure of tax avoidance is represented by BTD. This is commonly used in tax 
literature (Wilson, 2009; Lin et al., 2014; Hanlon, 2005; Gaaya et al., 2017).Specifically, firms that are 
relatively successful in avoiding taxes should maintain significant temporary or permanent differences 
between their accounting income and their taxable income (Frank et al., 2009).It refers to the difference 
between pre-tax income and estimated taxable income, scaled by total assets. To calculate the BTD for 
each firm, we first estimate the taxable income based on the current tax burden divided by the statutory tax 
rate. The current tax expense is the sum of current federal and foreign taxes or, if it is missing, the total tax 
expense less deferred taxes. Thus, companies engaging in a higher level of corporate tax avoidance have 
larger differences between accounting income and taxable income. Thus, we use BTD as a positive 
measure of tax avoidance. 
Independent variables 
The scores for the four dimensions of CSR- namely economic performance (ECOSCORE), social 
performance (SOCSCORE), environmental performance (ENVSCORE) and corporate-governance 
performance (CGSCORE)- are obtained from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database which adopts and 
implements a series of CSR activities. In parallel with the growing interest in CSR topics, there has been a 
substantial increase in the number and quality of organizations providing ESG (Environmental, Social and 
corporate Governance) data. In this article, we use ESG scores from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 which has 
been collecting data and scored firms on ESG dimensions since 2002.In addition to the ESG data from 
KLD databases, ASSET4's valuation universe has the reputation of being one of the most diligent and 
reputable CSR data sources. It covers approximately 4,500 companies and more than 500 variables. 
ASSET4 mainly collects information from publicly-available sources to fill more than 750 data points 
making up 250 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). 
The CSR score represents the weighted average of scores of four dimensions. KPIs are grouped into 
eighteen categories (see Appendix 1) which are sub-components of the four pillars i.e. economic, 
environmental, social and corporate-governance performance(Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). Each of the 
eighteen categories receives a score between 0 and 100, with high scores indicating a strong performance 
in the category. 
Control variables 
We include a set of control variables in our regression models, referring to the characteristics of firms 
that may influence tax-avoidance behaviors. To avoid the problems associated with uncorrelated variables, 
we also introduce several control variables that have been shown to be influential in previous researches 
about tax-avoidance (Stickney and McGee, 1982; Gupta and Newberry, 1997 and Rego, 2003).  
We first include the firm size (SIZE) which may indicate increased access to tax-planning strategies 
(resulting in lower taxes), but may also indicate increased visibility and political costs (resulting in higher 
taxes). A previous research (Johnson and Greening, 1999) has shown that the size of firms is positively 
associated with the social performance of firms. More specifically, because of their greater visibility, large 
companies are likely to provide more complete information about corporate social performance in the 
annual report than smaller companies (Cho et al., 2010). In addition, the firm size can have an impact on 
tax-reduction activities. Some studies suggest that large firms are likely to be more fiscally aggressive 
than small firms because they have greater economic and political power over smaller companies, and can 
reduce their tax burden accordingly (e, g., Gupta and Newberry, 1997).Other studies point out that larger 
firms are subject to more scrutiny by the public, incurring therefore "political costs" in the form of a 
higher exchange rate (Zimmerman, 1983).Moreover, leverage (LEV) is included as a control variable to 
indirectly represent the effect of debt on firms' incentives for tax planning. Besides, Return on Assets 
  
(ROA) is included to control profitability since the most profitable companies are subject to higher tax 
rates. Research and Development (RD) spending as an intangible asset allowing businesses to manage 
income in a tax-efficient way. In addition, they are positively associated with tax avoidance because of 
tax-deductible R & D expenditures. We also include inventory intensity (INVINT), corporations with high 
inventory levels, should be less tax avoidant. We finally include Big4 (BIG). Using a large audit firm can 
help reduce the company's tax avoidance activities through enhanced monitoring and auditing. A previous 
research has found a positive association between the engagement of a large auditor, the perception of the 
quality of the audit and the likelihood of detecting fraud in the financial statements (Matsumura and 
Tucker, 1992). As a result, companies audited by one of the four major audit firms are expected to be less 
tax avoidant than companies audited by other than the four major audit firms.  
All independent, controls variables and BTD are winsorized at the 90 percent level to control the 
effect of potential outliers. 
Empirical Model 
In order to examine the association between tax avoidance and CSR, we estimate the following basic 
regression model: 
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Where : TA is either the firm’s ETR or BTD. ETR=tax expense divided by pre-tax income; BTD = 
(pre-tax income minus estimated taxable income) divided by total assets; CSR = Weighted average of the 
four scores; SIZE = The natural logarithm of total assets; LEV = total long-term debt divided by total 
assets; ROA = pre-tax income divided by total assets; INVINT = total inventories divided by total assets; 
RD= Research and development expenses divided by total lagged assets; BIG =dummy variable taking the 
value 1 when the firm’s auditor belongs to the large international accounting firms, and 0 otherwise; ε is 
the error term. 
To test our sub-hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H1c and H1d), we run four different models where we include 
each of CSR dimensions as independent variable. They are estimated as follows: 
 
 = 1 + 2	 + 3		 + 4	 + 5	 + 6	 + 7	
+ 	BIG	 +  !"#$%&& ' + ((2) 
 
 = 1 + 2	 + 3		 + 4	 + 5	 + 6	 + 7	
+ 8	BIG	 +  !"#$%&& ' + ((3) 
 
 = 1 + 2	 + 3		 + 4	 + 5	 + 6	 + 7	
+ 8	BIG	 +  !"#$%&& ' + ((4) 
 
 = 1 + 2	+ + 3		 + 4	 + 5	 + 6	 + 7	
+ 8	BIG	 +  !"#$%&& ' + ((5) 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 below provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our study. For the dependent 
variable ETR, the mean (median) is 0.287 (0.276) with a series of values between 0-1. For BTD, the mean 
(median) is 0.075 (0.066).The ratings of the five CSR variables are between 6.780 and 95.530.The mean 
(median) of CSR is 61.466 (64.464), the mean (median) of the environmental score ENVSCORE is 
66.428 (77.185), the mean (median) of the economic score ECOSCORE is 57.822 (64.670), the mean 
(median) of social score SOCSCORE is 68,074 (77,110), and the mean (median) of the corporate 
  
governance score CGSCORE is 53,540 (57,440). The rest of the control variables are also presented in 
Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS RELATING TO SAMPLE FIRMS 
Variables Obs Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Std.Dev Min Max 
Test Variables 
ETR 7556 0.287 0.209 0.276 0.331 0.629 0 1 
BTD 8316 0.075 0.033 0.066 0.112 0.057 -0.006 0.179 
CSR 8596 61.466 47.646 64.464 77.210 19.402 13.453 93.545 
ENVSCORE 8596 66.428 41.080 77.185 91.730 27.840 18.530 94.390 
ECOSCORE 8596 57.822 30.290 64.670 86.235 30.681 6.780 94.960 
SOCSCORE 8596 68.074 47.300 77.110 91.260 26.081 20.420 95.530 
CGSCORE 8596 53.540 29.555 57.440 79.015 27.803 8.080 89.300 
Control Variables 
SIZE 8596 15.325 13.996 15.253 16.672 1.806 11.273 19.344 
ROA 8596 0.076 0.032 0.066 0.112 0.089 -0.206 0.391 
LEV 8596 0.198 0.081 0.180 0.285 0.151 0.000 0.672 
INV 8596 0.110 0.017 0.082 0.161 0.123 0.000 0.778 
RD 8596 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.036 0.000 0.209 
BIG 8596 0.884 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.320 0 1 
See Appendix 2 for variable definitions; data are obtained from WorldScope and ASSET4 databases. 
 
Table 3 presents the average and standard deviation of economic, environmental, social, corporate 
governance and the overall CSR indexes for each country during the sampling period. As can be seen, 
CSR scores vary considerably from one country to another. 
  
TABLE 3 
AVERAGE AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF CSR AND THAT OF THE CSR INDEX BY COUNTRY 
(N=8596) 
Country Firms Obs 
ENVSCORE ECOSCORE SOCSCORE CGSCORE CSR 
Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev 
Austria 11 154 70.275 21.865 73.387 24.407 70.002 24.676 55.371 23.163 67.258 14.384 
Belgium 21 308 67.655 27.285 71.798 24.809 76.879 20.527 49.787 23.510 66.53 13.344 
Denmark 23 350 58.253 28.054 69.909 27.262 84.885 15.712 56.179 24.464 67.306 16.240 
Finland 29 406 76.197 24.344 62.363 30.198 75.111 23.911 44.613 25.883 64.571 16.955 
France 82 1148 74.944 25.035 52.902 31.576 61.841 28.824 33.555 24.695 55.810 18.358 
Germany 60 840 68.984 28.797 60.631 30.247 66.511 26.506 43.541 26.262 59.917 17.948 
Greece 11 154 48.465 28.126 57.844 32.205 67.022 29.821 37.852 37.852 52.796 16.843 
Ireland 9 126 45.799 28.239 80.767 20.144 88.620 9.126 69.539 19.965 71.181 10.213 
Italy 27 378 65.774 30.444 56.783 32.299 67.097 27.247 52.409 29.565 60.516 21.097 
Netherlands 29 406 68.533 27.543 58.469 31.203 74.063 25.318 43.556 26.689 61.155 19.615 
Poland 10 140 88.430 20.485 69.447 29.528 79.563 23.534 55.584 22.978 73.256 16.730 
Portugal 8 112 67.631 26.929 43.925 35.265 48.546 33.209 25.155 24.525 46.314 24.600 
Spain 34 476 73.495 25.648 54.615 30.991 72.241 26.373 43.143 27.188 60.873 19.181 
Sweden 47 658 72.849 26.515 62.889 26.871 71.640 23.558 51.459 23.410 64.709 18.940 
UK 213 2982 59.636 26.912 53.264 30.303 64.410 24.769 69.982 21.684 61.823 20.513 
This table presents the average and the standard deviation of  the economic, environmental, social and corporate-governance dimensions, and that of the aggregate CSR 
index for each country of the final sample of 614 companies for the 2002- 2015 period. 
  
Correlation Results 
Appendix 3 presents the Pearson-pairwise correlation between the independent and control 
variables. We follow Kennedy (1985) who considers a critical value of 0.8 for the correlation 
coefficient behind which a serious problem of multi-collinearity between the independent variables 
and the control variables appears. 
The results of the correlation matrix reveal a positive and significant relationship between CSR 
and ECOSCORE (0.753), ENVSCORE (0.572), the highest correlation coefficient with SOCISCORE 
(0.790) and CGSCORE (0.648). For the control variables, the CSR is positively and significantly 
correlated with SIZE (0.335), LEV (0.085), INVINT (0.030), RD (0.026) and BIG (0.061). However, 
it is negatively correlated and not significant with ROA (-0.017).On the other hand, the four scores are 
strongly correlated with each other, and the rest of the control variables are generally correlated. So 
multi-collinearity is not problematic in our basic-regression model. 
Regression Results 
In table 4, column 1 presents the Tobit-regression results, and column 2 presents the GLS 
regression of the relationship between tax avoidance and the CSR. Furthermore, table 4 presents the 
results of the estimation of equation (1) when the independent variable is CSR. Column 1 shows that 
the coefficient of CSR is significantly negative at the level of 1% with ETR, and column 2 shows that 
the coefficient of CSR is significantly positive at the level of 1% with BTD. These results indicate that 
firms with higher CSR indexes pay lower taxes than other ones. Thus, our main hypothesis is not 
rejected. Consistent with Friedman's view, this shows that CSR and tax avoidance vary in the same 
direction, and are part of a same strategy i.e. maximizing profits. 
 
TABLE 4 
RELATION BETWEEN TAX AVOIDANCE AND CSR 
 
Variables 
ETR (1) BTD (6) 
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value 
CSR -0.052*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000 
SIZE -0.004* 0.100 -0.001*** 0.000 
ROA -0.393*** 0.000 0.686*** 0.000 
LEV 0.012 0.526 -0.010*** 0.000 
INVINT 0.034 0.244 0.009*** 0.000 
RD 0.011 0.908 0.035*** 0.000 
BIG -0.027** 0.040 0.002*** 0.000 
Constant 0.419*** 0.000 0.040*** 0.000 
Industry Fixed 
effects Yes Yes 
Model 
Significance  0.000
***
  0.000*** 
N  7556  8316 
***
, 
**
, 
*: significant at the threshold of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. 
The coefficient of CSR is multiplied by 100 for presentation issues. 
  
Remarkably, these findings are contrary to the results provided by Lanis and Richardson, (2012)who 
argue that socially responsible firms are less tax aggressive. However, they support the idea that "claims to 
engage in CSR can mask many inconsistencies in a company's CSR approach" (Sikka, 2010, p.12). 
Indeed, companies are simultaneously involved in CSR and tax-avoidance activities. In the view of Hoi et 
al. (2013), CSR activities are used as a way of promoting the risk-management tool to improve reputation. 
Overall, participating in tax-avoidance activities can expose companies to a variety of risks, including tax 
authority, audit risk, litigation risk and reputational risk (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010), and can destroy 
public trust.. Therefore, companies are coping with the potential negative consequences of tax-avoidance 
practices by increasing positive CSR activities. A company operates through considering an optimal 
balance between minimizing tax payments, and maintaining its reputation and legitimacy within the 
society. Furthermore, the results are in line with those ofHuseynov and Klamm (2012) and Davis et al. 
(2016) suggesting that it might be socially acceptable to reduce tax payments. As lower tax payments 
increase profitability, companies are better positioned to take part in costly CSR activities. through other 
means such as investing in infrastructure, research and development, and job creation.  
Concerning control variables, the coefficient of SIZE is generally inconsistent via the various 
measures of tax avoidance. For example, it is significantly and negatively related to tax avoidance when 
BTD is the dependent variable, which is consistent with the political cost hypothesis (Zimmerman, 1983). 
However, the relationship is positive when ETR is the dependent variable (Kim and Zhang, 2016). Our 
results also show that the regression coefficient of ROA is positively and significantly associated with tax 
avoidance at the 1% level with both measures, indicating profitable firms are more likely to conduct tax-
avoidance activities than less profitable firms. We also observe that the regression coefficients of LEV and 
INVINT are not significant with ETR. However, LEV is negative and significant at the level of 1% with 
BTD,  and INVINT is positive and significant at the 1% level with BTD. These results are not supported 
by previous studies (Lanis and Richardson, 2012; Richardson et al., 2015).Besides, we find that some of 
the RD-regression coefficients are not significant with ETR, but are positively associated with BTD, so 
companies having a high research and development intensity are more likely to avoid tax.Finally, the 
regression coefficient of BIG is positive and significantly associated with tax avoidance. While the 
coefficient is mathematically modest, big audit firms have an important role in the process of tax 
avoidance. 
Table 5 reports the results of the estimation of equation (2) when the independent variables are 
economic, environmental, social and corporate-governance performance. It shows the results by 
incorporating them separately into four individual models. First, the regression coefficient of ECOSCORE 
remains positively significant for both measures at the 1% level with tax avoidance. This result is in line 
with the findings of Laguir and al.(2015).The regression coefficient for ENVSCORE is significantly 
negative with ETR at the 5% level,  and negatively insignificant with BTD. We also observe that the 
regression coefficient of SOCSCORE is significantly negative with ETR at the 10% level, and 
significantly positive with BTD at the 1% level. Finally, the regression coefficient of CGSCORE is 
positively associated with tax avoidance. This result which is in line with Huseynov and Klamm (2012) 
suggest that a strong corporate governance would be linked to a higher degree of tax avoidance. The 
control variables in this analysis show the same results as the control variables in the first regression 
model. ROA and BIG are positively and significantly associated with tax avoidance in all models. 
INVINT and RD are positive and significant, and LEV is negative and significant except with BTD.
  
TABLE 5 
RELATION BETWEEN TAX AVOIDANCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PERFORMANCE 
 ETR(2) ETR(3) ETR(4) ETR (5) BTD (7) BTD(8) BTD (9) BTD (10) 
ECOSCORE -0.027*** - - - 0.003*** - - - 
ENVSCORE - -0.019** - - - -0.000 - - 
SOCSCORE - - -0.018* - - - 0.002*** - 
CGSCORE - - - -0.028*** - - - 0.003*** 
SIZE -0.005** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
ROA -0.390*** -0.400*** -0.395*** -0.396*** 0.685*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 
LEV 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.013 -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
INVINT 0.012 0.037 0.034 0.035 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
RD -0.029 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
BIG -0.030** -0.029** -0.029** -0.025** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Constant 0.427*** 0.426*** 0.039*** 0.431*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 
IndustryFixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model sig 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 
N 7556 7556 7556 7556 8316 8316 8316 8316 
***
, 
**
, 
*:
 significant at the threshold of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 2.The coefficient of CSR is multiplied by 100 
for presentation issues. 
  
To summarize, we have found that all CSR scores are positively related to tax avoidance. Hence, tax 
avoidance do not depend on the nature of the CSR activities a firm engages in. These results support the 
view that companies take care of their social responsibility, but at the same time, engage in tax-avoidance 
strategies (Sikka 2010). Our data indicate that managers or other stakeholders do not view corporate-tax 
payments as part of a company's socially responsible behavior. Therefore, consistent with Friedman's 
(1970) view, CSR and tax avoidance act as complements rather than substitutes. Moreover, our evidence 
provides that the financial benefits that can be derived from tax avoidance can generate net benefits for 
shareholders while meeting the needs and desires of stakeholders(Garcia 2016). CGSCORE results 
indicate that, ultimately corporate governance seems to be at the service of the shareholders before serving 
the other stakeholders, and that the governing bodies ensure the maximization of economic value for 
shareholders by considering the tax avoidance as compatible with socially responsible activities. 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
We perform a separate analysis for companies with high and low CSR indexes. We create an 
indicator variable to designate the firms of the highest or lowest quintiles of CSR, and we reestimate the 
equation model (1) using CSR_High and CSR_Low in place of CSR. The results of the estimation of this 
regression are shown in Table 6. CSR_High is significantly positive with tax avoidance contrariwise to 
CSR_Low which is negative but non significantly associated with tax avoidance. This result suggests that 
highly-ranked firms are responsible for the positive relationship between tax avoidance and the CSR index 
reported in Table 4. It supports the view that the most socially responsible companies engage in tax- 
avoidance strategies. Companies see that engaging in CSR activities maintains their reputation and 
legitimacy. They reduce their tax liabilities to involve in costly CSR activities, and spend money on social 
projects. They directly improve social welfare through investing in the infrastructure, fostering innovation, 
contributing to environmental protection and job creation, and enhancing overall economic development 
and growth. This finding is in line with the results of  Davis et al. (2016), and contrasts those of Hoi et al. 
(2013) who provide evidence that firms with weak CSR activities avoid more taxes. 
 
TABLE 6 
RELATION BETWEEN TAX AVOIDANCE AND THE INDEX HIGH/LOW CSR 
Variables ETR BTD 
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value 
CSR_High -0.949* 0.074 0.140*** 0.000 
CSR_Low 1.159** 0.021 -0.056 0.137 
SIZE -0.005** 0.008 -0.001*** 0.000 
ROA -0.394*** 0.000 0.686*** 0.000 
LEV 0.012 0.578 -0.010*** 0.000 
INVINT 0.035 0.588 0.010*** 0.000 
RD -0.011 0.981 0.034*** 0.000 
BIG -0.027** 0.041 0.002*** 0.000 
Constant  0.403*** 0.000 0.042*** 0.000 
Industry Fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes 
Model sig 0,000*** 0,000*** 
N 7556 8316 
***, **, *:
 significant at the threshold of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The coefficient of CSR is multiplied by 
100 for presentation issues. 
 
  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Much of the literature on CSR and tax avoidance is theoretical in nature (Garcia 2016). The link 
between CSR and tax avoidance falls within the framework of two competing theories: shareholder theory 
(Friedman, 1970) and stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1994; Carroll, 1979; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
The purpose of this researchis to study the relationship between the CSR and tax avoidance practices in an 
international framework, taking advantage of a relative consistencyof CSR in the European Union. In 
addition, we determine the CSR activities associated with theprobability for a company to avoid taxes. 
These activities are represented by four dimensions, including economic, environmental, social and 
corporate-governance performance.Based on a sample of 614companies from 15 EU member statesover 
the period of 2002-2015, we find that CSR index is negatively related to ETR, and positively associeted 
with BTD. Overall,this research supports the view that the higher the level of CSR activities of a firm is, 
the higher the level of tax avoidance is.This result is confirmed in our additional analysis as we find that 
the most socially responsible companies do avoid more corporate taxes than other companies.This result 
suggests that companies classified as highly responsible are at the origin of the positive relationship 
between tax avoidance and the CSR index. These findings are inconsistent with existing 
researchesconcluding that low CSR firms avoid more taxes (Lanis and Richardson, 2012 and 2015; 
Muller, 2015; Sikka, 2010). Moreover, as in Sikka (2010), our study draws attention to the gaps between 
the corporate discourseon the one hand and decisions and actionson the other hand.The fact that all CSR 
scores are positively related to tax avoidance leads to the conclusion thattax avoidance do not depend on 
the nature of the CSR activities a company engages in. Overall, the findings supports the Friedman's 
theory suggesting thattax paymentsand CSR act as substitutes. 
Our study has some limitations. First,like other studies attempting to measure tax avoidance, the ETR 
is calculated in accordance with the information presented in the financial statements, and may not 
represent the actual tax situation.We have also used an approximate value of taxable income to measure 
the BTD. These proxies remain an approximation of the level of tax avoidance, and may differ from the 
actual level of tax avoidance. Second, due to the limited availability of CSR data, it was not possible to 
use alternative measures of CSR. Other databases such as KLD database could be used for robustness 
analyses. Third, our models explain tax avoidance by CSR, and we recognize a possible endogeneity 
problem since CSR expenses could at the same time depend on tax avoidance behavior. Firms could see 
more need to engage in CSR activities to offset the negative reputation resulting from aggressive tax 
behavior. 
Future researches on tax avoidance and CSR could look into a number of important issues. First, it 
would be interesting to perform this study in an international sample of emerging countries.There is a little 
research in this area while, for example, lot of polluting countries or not respectful of employees' rights 
are emerging countries. Second, the role of ethics in conducting CSR activities and corporate tax policy 
requires a further study. Eventually, a comparison between the CSR disclosure and CSR actual activities is 
worth being deeply investigated to better understand the relation with tax avoidance. 
 
ENDNOTES 
1Sikka (2010) defines tax avoidance as a lawful activity promoted by 'novel interpretations' and 'technical skills' 
ofloopholes of the law, which can be inconsistent with the spirit of the law. 
2
 Our dependent variable measured by ETR is truncated to the 0–1 range, so we use Tobit- regression analysis 
(seee.g., Tobin, 1958; Amemiya, 1973) 
 
 
  
APPENDIX 1 
DESCRIPTION OF ASSET4 PILLARS AND CATEGORIES (RIBANDO AND BONNE, 
2010) 
 
Pillars Categories 
Economic performance  
(ECOSCORE) 
Customer loyalty 
Economic performance 
Shareholder loyalty 
  
Environmental performance 
(ENVSCORE) 
Reducing a company's resources 
Reducing emissions 
Product innovation 
  
Social performance  
(SOCISCORE) 
Quality of employment 
Health and safety 
Training and development 
Diversity 
Human rights 
Community and product responsibility 
  
Corporate Governance performance 
(CGSCORE) 
Board structure 
Compensation policy 
Board functions 
Shareholder rights  
Vision and strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX 2 
DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES 
 
Variables Measures Descriptions Data sources 
Dependent Variable 
Tax avoidance: 
 
Effective tax rate ETR Total income taxes divided by 
pre-tax income. 
Datastream database 
 
Book-tax difference BTD Pre-tax accounting income 
minus estimated taxable income 
based on total assets 
Datastream database 
 
Independent Variables 
Corporate social 
responsibility 
 
CSR 
 
CSR score is the weighted 
average of four scores. 
Companies receive a score on 
their economic, environmental, 
social and corporate-governance 
performance. 
 
Asset4 
 
Economic score ECOSCORE Companies receive a score on 
their economic performance 
between 0 and 100 with a 
higher score indicating a better 
performance. 
Asset4 
Environmental score ENVSCORE Companies receive a score on 
their environmental 
performance between 0 and 100 
with a higher score indicating a 
better performance. 
Asset4 
Social score SOCSCORE Companies receive a score on 
their social performance 
between 0 and 100 with a 
higher score indicating a better 
performance. 
Asset4 
Corporate governance 
score 
CGSCORE Companies receive a score on 
their corporate governance 
performance between 0 and 100 
with a higher score indicating a 
better performance. 
Asset4 
Control variables 
Size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
for firm i in year t. 
Datastream database 
 
    
  
Leverage LEV Total long-term debt divided by 
total assets for firm i in year t 
Datatsream database 
 
 
    
Return on Assets ROA Measured as  the pre-tax 
income divided by total assets 
Datastream database 
 
    
Inventory intensity INVINT Inventory divided by total assets Datastream database 
 
    
Research and 
development 
RD Research and development 
expense (RD) divided by lagged 
total assets (AT) 
Datastream database 
 
    
Auditor BIG A dichotomous value taking the 
value 1 when the auditor of the 
company is one of the big audit 
firms (Big4), and zero 
otherwise. 
Datastream database 
 
Additional test variables 
 CSR_High An indicator variable equal to 1 if 
the firm is in the highest quintile 
of CSR, and 0 otherwise 
 
 CSR_Low An indicator variable equal to 1 if 
a firm is in the lowest quintile of 
CSR_Index, and 0 otherwise 
 
  
APPENDIX 3 
PEARSON-CORRELATION RESULTS 
 
CSR ECOSCORE ENVSCORE SOCISCORE CGSCORE SIZE LEV ROA INVINT RD BIG 
CSR 1 
          
ECOSCORE 0.753*** 1 
         
ENVSCORE  0.572*** 0.204*** 1 
        
SOCISCORE  0.790*** 0.511*** 0.302*** 1 
       
CGSCORE 0.648*** 0.314*** 0.087*** 0.400*** 1 
      
SIZE 0.335*** 0.222*** 0.522*** 0.253*** -0.071*** 1 
     
LEV 0.085*** 0.031*** 0.092*** 0.072*** 0.042*** 0.185*** 1 
    
ROA -0.017 0.053*** -0.143*** -0.007 0.043*** -0.214*** -0.308*** 1 
   
INVINT 0.030*** 0.006 0.094*** 0.007 -0.025** -0.084*** -0.281*** 0.122*** 1 
  
RD 0.026** 0.009 0.100*** 0.012 -0.049*** 0.015 -0.218*** 0.079*** 0.234*** 1 
 
BIG 0.061*** -0.046*** 0.028*** 0.019* 0.175*** -0.051*** 0.051*** 0.045*** 0.037*** -0.001 1 
***
, 
**
, 
*: significant at the threshold of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. 
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